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Executive Summary   
 
This paper empirically examines the effect of current tax policy on home ownership, 
specifically looking at how developer contributions impact house prices.  Developer 
contributions are a commonly used mechanism for local governments to pay for new urban 
infrastructure.  This research applies a hedonic house price model to 4,699 new and 25,053 
existing house sales in Brisbane from 2005 to 2011.  
 
The findings of is research are consistent with international studies that support the 
proposition that developer contributions are over passed.  This study has provided evidence 
that suggest developer contributions are over passed to both new and existing homes in the 
order of around 400%.  These findings suggest that developer contributions are thus a 
significant contributor to increasing house prices, reduced housing supply and are thus an 
inefficient and inequitable tax.   
 
By testing this effect on both new and existing homes, this research provides evidence in 
support of the proposition that not only are developer contributions over passed to new 
home buyers but also to buyers of existing homes.  Thus the price inflationary effect of these 
developer contributions are being felt by all home buyers across the community, resulting in 
increased mortgage repayments of close to $1,000 per month in Australia.   
 
This is the first study to empirically examine the impact of developer contributions on house 
prices in Australia. These results are important as they inform governments on the outcomes 
of current tax policy on home ownership, providing the first evidence of its kind in Australia.  
This is an important contribution to the tax reform agenda in Australia.  
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Introduction 
Housing is widely regarded as the largest investment most Australians make in their lifetime, 
however despite all levels of government having housing affordability policies, housing 
affordability remains at critical levels (Demographia, 2013).  At the same time, the provision 
of new urban infrastructure in growing communities has been a policy dilemma for 
governments since the 1950’s (Neutze, 1995).  On one hand, governments may appease 
existing residents by shifting the responsibility of funding new growth related infrastructure 
from the government to the development industry (Burge, 2008); however on the other hand, 
the passing on of these costs to new homeowners is said to directly contribute to reduced 
housing affordability (Been, 2005).   
 
There is an extensive body of international literature that discusses the passing on (to home 
buyers) or passing back (to the englobo land seller) of developer contributions (Nelson et al., 
2008).  Regardless of the direction of passing and the various market elasticities, in the long 
term the outcome appears inevitable that house prices rise as a result of developer 
contributions (Been, 2005).  The question that remains in debate is:  how much do developer 
contributions increase house prices by?  In a climate where housing affordability is a policy 
objective for many governments (Queensland Government, 2007) a clear understanding of 
the impacts these government charges have on the price and supply of new housing is 
imperative.  Despite over a dozen separate studies over two decades in the US on this topic, 
no empirical works have been carried out in Australia to test if similar shifting or overshifting 
occurs in Australia.  This research seeks to close that knowledge gap through hedonic 
modelling of developer contributions and house prices using data from Brisbane, 
Queensland.   
 
The term “Developer contributions” is a term that is used to encompass the estimated 
proportionate cost of providing trunk and other off site urban infrastructure such as local 
roads, stormwater and community facilities and parks to new developments.  It is a one off 
charge levied on the developer by the local authority, generally at the time of 
rezoning/planning approval (Been, 2005, Burge, 2008, Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Bryant and Eves, 
2014). 
 
These costs historically were raised through general revenue, however in high growth areas 
existing home owners have been increasingly reluctant to fund the infrastructure 
requirements of new development (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003). Hence developer 
contributions were introduced to shift these costs to the private sector  (Burge, 2005).  
Around the globe, various terminologies are used to describe what are essentially user-pays 
urban infrastructure funding mechanisms.  For example, the term “Impact Fees” is used 
throughout the majority of the US, “Development Charges” is prominent in Canada, 
“Planning obligation”, “planning gain” or “Section 106 agreements” are all terms used today 
to describe the equivalent to an infrastructure charging system in the UK (Evans, 2004). 
“Exactions” is a general term used in Indian (3iNetwork) and some American literature, whilst 
in Australia “Developer Charges”, “Infrastructure Charges”, “Developer Contributions” or 
“Development Levies” are largely interchangeable terms depending on the jurisdiction.   
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The purpose of this report is to inform the House of Representatives Inquiry into Home 
Ownership.  It specifically addresses Terms of Reference items 2, 4 and 5 being: 
 Demand and supply drivers in the housing market; 
 The impact of current tax policy at all levels; and 
 Opportunities for reform. 
Specifically, this report is an excerpt of recently completed doctoral research that 
investigates the impact of developer contributions on house prices.  The study area for this 
research is Brisbane, Queensland, however it is expected that the findings will have 
relevance to other jurisdictions in Australia that charge developer levies for the provision of 
urban infrastructure.  
This introductory section sets the background for this report.  The following section details 
the relevant literature, whilst the third section outlines the methodology used for this 
empirical research.  The forth section presents the data, with the results to follow, and the 
last section concludes. 
Literature 
Internationally, the issue of developer contributions and the impact on house prices is widely 
documented.  Developer contributions were originally intended to transfer the burden of 
infrastructure provision in high growth areas from the public purse on to developers (Evans-
Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  However, in a competitive market  the theoretical literature is 
consistent in its conclusions that despite market conditions developer contributions are 
passed onto home buyers in the long run and will thus lead to increased housing prices 
(Been, 2005, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004, Burge 
and Ihlanfeldt, 2006).   
 
This theoretical concept is consistently captured by a vast number of academics, particularly 
in the US and Canada over the past three decades (Bryant and Eves, 2014).  With 
supporting theoretical literature dating back to the 1970’s, current international literature now 
largely assumes it as a given that developer contributions increase the price of new housing 
in the long run (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
 
If the theoretical work is largely consistent in its conclusions that developer contributions 
lead to increased housing prices, the next question that follows is:  how much do house 
prices increase by?  In the US, there is a well established body of empirical research that 
has evolved from this theoretical evidence on the cost impact of developer contributions on 
new housing over the past 35+ years (Been, 2005, Nelson et al., 2008).  Review of this 
literature reveals however, it is a danger to assume that passing, or shifting of costs is at 
parity (ie. $1.00 extra for developer contributions = $1.00 passed on or back).  The literature 
indicates that it is common for “over shifting” to occur, with home buyers paying a greater 
incremental increase in the cost of the new home (as compared to the cost of the developer 
charge) as developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and return on costs 
(Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006, Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004).   
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Whilst the findings of the empirical research to date are consistent in quantifying a consistent 
“overshifting” of developer contributions to housing prices, the methodologies used vary 
greatly, as does the extent of overshifting identified.  In these studies, a $1.00 developer 
charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.13 for the developed lot only 
(Evans-Cowley et al., 2005), $0.23 increase in new house price (Dresch and Sheffrin, 1997) 
and up to $3.58 increase in new house price (Singell and Lillydahl, 1990).  With the evolution 
of better specified models, the research in the last decade from the US indicates that for 
every $1.00 increase in developer contributions, new housing costs increase $1.50 to $1.70 
(Nelson et al., 2008).  However widely varying results prevail for existing houses ($0.83 to 
$6.03) where reasons for this effect are even more confounding and perhaps concerning 
when the impact on housing affordability for the wider community (for which they may 
receive no benefit) is considered.  
 
Until now, this debate has gone largely unanswered in Australia by the academic 
community.  Recently Gurran and colleagues considered the issue of planning costs and 
housing affordability from a broader qualitative perspective using case studies (Gurran et al., 
2009, Ruming et al., 2011, Gurran et al., 2010, Gurran et al., 2008).  These examine the 
impact of all government charges and planning regulations on housing costs in each of the 
three eastern seaboard States.  Amongst other findings, this research limits its findings on 
the impact of developer contributions to concluding that all planning charges have increased 
at a greater and disproportionate rate to median house prices, however no empirical 
evidence of the direct impact of developer contributions on house price increases is 
provided. 
 
A thorough search of the literature has been unable to identify any empirical studies on this 
topic outside of the US and Canada.  This is despite the wide spread usage of user-pays 
urban infrastructure systems throughout the world.  It is suggested that this dearth of 
research has been due to a lack of publicly available data as experienced in the UK and 
Australian research efforts to date.  
 
The absence of empirical data on this house price effect is fuelling the debate in Australia as 
to whether developer contributions do get passed on to home buyers or not.  This is a 
significant gap in the Australian research, and this paper seeks to provide the first empirical 
study of its kind for Australia to address this gap.  
Methodology 
Hedonic price models based on multiple regression theory provide for differentiation of 
individual supply and demand attributes (vectors of characteristics whose prices are not 
independently observed) whilst controlling for heterogeneous characteristics that are 
commonly thought to contribute to house price such as location, neighbourhood, age, 
number of bedrooms and the like (Dougherty, 2011, Hill, 2012).   
 
Review of the empirical models used internationally to estimate the effect of developer 
contributions on house prices suggests that the use of an ordinary least squares hedonic 
regression model is appropriate for this study.  The hedonic approach is a relatively 
straightforward method once the requisite data is acquired and transformed into the 
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appropriate scale and format.  The relative simplicity of the hedonic approach is one of its 
strengths and hence why it has been in use since Rosen’s (1974) seminary work.   
  
Various techniques have been employed in the literature over the past three decades in an 
attempt to estimate the effect of developer contributions on house prices.  In all cases, 
hedonic models formed the basis of the extant analysis, with other techniques employed 
such as repeat sales indices, stock flow models, instrument variable regression, fixed and 
random effects and treatment effects.  However in many cases, the more complex models 
provided insignificant findings and supplied no additional evidence over the basic hedonic 
method.  This suggests that despite various attempts at overcoming the limitations of basic 
hedonic models, the results in the literature are relatively consistent and more complex 
econometric forms may not add any additional accuracy to the estimation of the house price 
impacts of developer contributions.  Hence it can be concluded that despite the numerous 
econometric model variations undertaken to date, no single technique has emerged as the 
preferred house price model over the basic hedonic methodology and that a simple linear 
form equation may remain appropriate. 
 
In building the model, a step-wise approach was adopted to test the theory of additional 
variables adding greater predictive qualities to the model.  Structural elements were 
regressed initially, with locational elements added in a second step, then the jurisdictional 
and (government) policy elements added in the final step.  The final model is indicated 
below: 
 
 Equ. 1 
Where   
 
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house: lot area; number of bedrooms, bathrooms and 
car parking spaces, dummy for new or existing home  
Li =  Locational features of the house:  region and socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors that might affect the price of a house: changes to household 
income levels; population growth; new housing supply; unemployment rate; 
construction cost index;  mortgage rates;  consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy factors that might affect the price of the house: developer 
contributions  
 = error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
Data 
This study examines the effect of developer contributions on both new and existing houses 
in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. The pooled dataset is also analysed.  Brisbane is the 
State capital of Queensland and is the economic hub of South-East Queensland. This is 
Australia’s third largest metropolitan region, comprising 3.1 million people, of which 
approximately 70% reside in the Greater Brisbane area, accounting for approximately half of 
the State’s population (ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics), 2012).  The data used for this 
study includes a sample of suburbs in Brisbane’s northern growth corridor as well as the 
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same in Brisbane’s southern growth corridor.  The study period for this research is from 
2005 to 2011.   
 
Full sales record data for all houses and vacant residential lots for the period 2005 to 2011 in 
the local government areas in this study was provided by a commercial re-seller of the state 
and local government sales records.  This provided the structural data including:  address, 
real property description, lot size, sale price, sale date (contract date), settlement date, 
number of bedrooms/bathrooms/carparks, zoning, sale type, land use, buyer and seller 
details.  Sales data was cleansed to remove:  non arms length transactions, part sales, 
multiple transaction sales, and court order transactions.  The sales with incomplete data 
were removed.  Data on the size of the house and the age of the house were not available.  
To categorise each sale as a New or Existing house a data rule was established whereby 
any house which sold (or resold) within four years of the initial lot sale was deemed to be a 
New house salei.  Any house sale that did not meet these New house criteria, was 
categorised as an Existing house.   
 
Next locational data was considered. The US property tax system and access to the services 
it finances, is considered an important factor in many of the extant house price models that 
estimate the impact of developer contributions.  That is, a house located in an area that has 
well funded services and amenities is more desirable.  Thus buyers are willing to pay more 
to live in those areas, than those which are less well serviced (ie. lower quality schools, 
roads, fire departments, law enforcement etc.)  This is in contrast to the egalitarian nature of 
Australian society where such services and amenities are largely funded by general revenue 
from State taxes and available to all residents.  
   
Both the Brisbane northside and southside study areas incorporate established suburbs as 
well as newly developing suburbs, with new and existing housing being close substitutes 
from a services and amenities perspective.  That is, all suburbs in the study areas have 
access to essentially the same level of basic utilities, roads, schools, public officials, law 
enforcement, fire and community services.  Each study area includes only one local authority 
sub-area.  This is a characteristic particular to the Queensland market, where very large 
local government areas existii.  The local authority sub-areas were selected as they are 
roughly consistent with the catchment areas for housing markets, assuming residents wish 
to buy within a desired locality.  It is acknowledged that substitutability at the fringes with the 
neighbouring sub-areas will exist to some extent, however as this is a two-way effect, it is 
fair to assume a net zero outcome.   
 
Whilst in theory, all residents have access to the same level of services and amenities 
regardless of the suburb they live it, housing markets do vary within the study areas, with 
some suburbs in the study areas being more or less desirable than others.  In order to take 
such factors into consideration the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (“ABS”) “Index of Relative 
Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage” (“IRSAD”) has been utilisediii.  This index 
summarises information about the economic and social conditions of people and households 
within an area, including both relative advantage and disadvantage.  This index provides a 1 
– 10 rating at a suburb level as a relative measure of socio-economic advantage and 
disadvantage.  A low score indicates relatively greater disadvantage and a lack of advantage 
in general.  A high score indicates a relative lack of disadvantage and greater advantage in 
general (ABS, 2013).  This 1-10 suburb rating has been used in this study as a proxy for the 
desirability of a house’s “location”, with a score of 10 being a highly desirable location for 
Inquiry into Home Ownership QUT 
 
6  
 
house buyers, and a score of 1 being a less desirable location for house buyers.  It therefore 
follows that one would expect house prices to be higher in the more desirable suburbs, and 
lower in the less desirable suburbs by virtue of the nature of the suburb. The data set 
supplied full address details for each sales record. 
 
Jurisdictional data was sourced from the ABS web site, with the exception of data on the 30 
year home mortgage rates, consumer sentiment and inflation, which was sourced from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia web site.  Where monthly or quarterly data existed, annual 
averages were derived (by calendar year).   Data on common supply and demand house 
price drivers were sought at a local government level (rather than State level) to ensure 
regional sub-market effects were suitably accommodated.   
 
The government policy variable that is relevant to house price over the study period is the 
developer contributions.  Unfortunately, developer charge data is not readily available in 
Queensland and has been a limiting factor in the progression of this type of research.  In 
order to access such data, large private land developers were approached to supply 
developer charge data for their projects.  The developers that were approached supplied 
data on the developer contributions levied on their projects in the study area.  The total 
developer contributions applicable to a stage were divided by the number of lots in that stage 
to determine the charge per lot.  The applicable rate per annum was derived from the year 
the stage was released and sold and adopted as the average developer charge applicable in 
the study area.  A one year lag was applied to account for the time between development 
approval and completion of the project.    
 
The final data set for this study comprised of 4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales in 
Brisbane from 2005 to 2011.  Table 1 describes the independent variables utilised in the 
model estimation.  Table 2 indicates the summary statistics for both the New and Existing 
data sets.  
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Table 1  Variable Legend 
Variable Definition 
Structural 
Attributes 
 
SQM Lot size in square metres 
BEDS Total number of bedrooms 
BATHS Total number of bathrooms 
CARS Total number of car parking spaces 
TYPE Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Existing (0) or New (1) 
  
Locational 
Attributes 
 
REGION Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Brisbane Northside (0) or Southside (1) 
IRSAD 1-10  ranking of suburb as indicated by the Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage 
  
Jurisdictional 
Attributes 
 
YEAR Time variable for year of sale 
POPRATE Percentage rate of change in population (LGA*) 
INCOME Percentage increase in median household income (LGA*) 
BDLG Percentage change in building approvals  (LGA*) 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (LGA*) 
CONSTN Percentage change in construction cost index for Brisbane (capital city) 
MTGE Average 30 year mortgage rate (Australia) 
CONSS Consumer sentiment index (Australia) 
  
Policy Attributes  
IC Annual developer contribution adopted on a per lot basis, based on year of sale of lot. 
FHOG Dummy variable indicating whether the sale occurred in a year with a high FHOG (1 in 2009 for new and 
existing, 1 in 2011 for new only) or normal FHOG (0) 
*LGA = data obtained at a local government area level 
Table 2  Summary Statistics –Houses   
Variable Mean Std Dev 
PRICE 471,863.63 148,510.16 
SQM 687.58 333.59 
BEDS 3.63 0.77 
BATHS 1.78 0.65 
CARS 1.93 0.74 
TYPE 0.16 0.37 
REGION 0.47 0.50 
IRSAD 7.26 2.48 
YEAR 2007.61 1.72 
POPRATE 2.77 0.69 
INCOME 4.99 1.49 
BDLG - 4.70 16.68 
UNEMP 3.59 1.00 
CONSTN 4.23 2.66 
MTGE 7.56 0.93 
CONSS 105.29 8.48 
IC 12,080.79 4,536.60 
FHOG 0.21 0.41 
n 29,752  
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Step-Wise Process 
The pooled dataset was first analysed to assess the effect of developer contributions on all 
housing in the study area.  Separate models for both New and Existing houses were also run 
to determine if a differential effect between new and existing housing was evident.   
 
A step-wise approach was adopted to test the additional predictive value of the model upon 
the inclusion of more independent variables.  The structural elements were regressed 
initially, with locational elements added in a second step, then the jurisdictional and 
(government) policy elements added in the final step.  The results of the process using 
Brisbane All house data are indicated in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3   Step Wise Process Model Summary
d
 – All Houses 
  R Adjusted 
R 
Std Error of    Change  Statisti
cs 
  
Model R Square Square Estimates R
2
 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .68
3
a
 
.467 .467 108443.5
41 
.467 5210.
088 
5 2974
6 
.000 
2 .74
3
b
 
.552 .552 99457. 0
3 
.085 1873.
676 
3 2974
3 
.000 
3 .75
6
c
 
.572 .571 97222.50
9 
.020 173.8
93 
8 297
5 
.000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA  (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA, A_Cci, A_Css, AC_Inc, 
AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr  (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable: IA_Price 
 
These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the house price model improve 
as the additional independent variables are added, as would be expected.  This 
process was followed for each of the regressions performed.  The results of the 
process using Brisbane New house data are indicated in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4   Step Wise Process Model Summary
d
 – New Houses 
   Adj  Std Error of    Change  Statistics  
Model R R
2
 R
2
 Estimates R
2
 
Change 
F  
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F  
chang
e 
1 .602
b
 .363 .362 110910.394 .363 667.508 4 4694 .000 
2 .657
c
 .431 .430 104810.919 .069 188.411 3 4691 .000 
3 .671
d
 .451 .449 103083.167 .020 20.821 8 4683 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year, (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year,  
AC_Pop,AC_Bul,A_Upr,A_Cci,A_Mgr,A_Css,DC_1L (Structural+Locational+Jurisdictional+ Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
 
The results of the process using Brisbane Existing house data are indicated in Table 
5 below.  These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the house price 
models improve as the additional independent variables are added, as would be 
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expected, albeit with diminishing returns.  Incorporating all variables, an adjusted R2 
of .45 and .58 is achieved for New and Existing houses respectively. 
 
Table 5   Step Wise Process Model Summary
d
 – Existing Houses 
   Adj  Std Error of    Change  Statistics  
Model R R
2
 R
2
 Estimates R
2
 
Change 
F  
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F  
change 
1 .687
a
 .472 .472 107759.635 .472 5596.127 4 25048 .000 
2 .750
b
 .563 .562 98082.742 .091 1729.770 3 25045 .000 
3 .764
c
 .583 .583 95759.229 .021 154.767 8 25037 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year, (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year,  
AC_Pop,AC_Bul,A_Upr,A_Cci,A_Mgr,A_Css,DC_Ifc_1L (Structural+Locational+Jurisdictional+Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
 
Results 
The data set was split by Type to test the difference in house price impacts due to developer 
contributions between existing housing and new housing.  The literature indicates developer 
contributions have a higher inflationary effect on existing housing compared to new housing.  
Whilst a higher level of overpassing is consistently observed in the literature (Existing 
compared to New) the degree to which this overpassing effect is amplified varies 
considerably between studies.  Little theory or rationale is presented as to why developer 
contributions increase existing house prices by more than new house prices. 
 
All Houses 
 
The regression results for the pooled data set for Brisbane houses are provided in Table 7.  
All outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent with the exception of 
building approvals (significance only) and consumer sentiment (sign and significance).   
Unemployment is significant at seven percent.   
 
The independent variables of building approvals, consumer confidence and unemployment 
are problematic in all models due to their high multicolinearity, which is a feature of the 
observational nature of the data.  On one hand it is tempting to remove these variables from 
the models all together.  However that leaves one open to criticism of potential omitted 
variable bias.  A number of the extant studies omit variables that theory would indicate have 
an impact on house prices.  It is unknown as to whether these variables were purposefully 
excluded in those models due to similar multicolinearity issues, or omitted in the model 
design process.  In this instance, the decision was made to leave these variables in the 
models despite their apparent lack of statistical significance due to a combination of factors:  
firstly, whilst the jurisdictional variables add to the predictive value of the model, their 
contribution is incremental rather than substantial.  Secondly, these variables are consistent 
with house price theory and for them to remain avoids criticisms of omitted variable bias.  
Thirdly, the variables in question are not the direct subject of this research;  and finally given 
highly correlated variables may not necessarily cause estimation problems, it is 
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commonplace to leave them in a model, particularly one that relies on observational data 
(Washington et al., 2011).   
   
Moving on to the regression results, given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of 
the developer contribution coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 3.952 together with a significance 
of .000, this indicates that these results provide strong evidence that a $1.00 increase in 
developer contributions increases all house prices in Brisbane by $3.95.   
 
Table 7  Regression Results – All Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 71170.133 22.120 .000 64863.908 77476.358 
  Area 141.856 71.420 .000 137.963 145.750 
  Bedrooms 32808.207 30.774 .000 30718.635 34897.778 
  Bathrooms 89582.075 70.089 .000 87076.915 92087.236 
  Carparks 9939.191 10.960 .000 8161.724 11716.658 
  Type 34338.842 19.099 .000 30814.854 37862.830 
2 (Constant) -31193538.821 -44.49 .000 -32567566.00 -29819511.63 
  Area 148.572 80.737 .000 144.965 152.179 
  Bedrooms 26844.006 27.341 .000 24919.589 28768.424 
  Bathrooms 71547.331 59.308 .000 69182.815 73911.846 
  Carparks 10266.891 12.295 .000 8630.169 11903.614 
  Type 32969.576 19.736 .000 29695.311 36243.841 
  SEIFA 14289.998 56.074 .000 13790.494 14789.502 
  Region 48922.196 39.258 .000 46479.670 51364.722 
  Year 15534.325 44.487 .000 14849.900 16218.749 
3 (Constant) -14289656.089 -4.368 .000 -20702008.705 -7877303.473 
  Area 147.350 81.866 .000 143.822 150.878 
  Bedrooms 26614.412 27.729 .000 24733.140 28495.684 
  Bathrooms 71745.412 60.830 .000 69433.668 74057.156 
  Carparks 10617.273 13.004 .000 9016.939 12217.608 
  Type 31499.814 19.265 .000 28295.007 34704.621 
  SEIFA 14396.730 57.781 .000 13908.361 14885.098 
  Region 53643.331 6.675 .000 37892.328 69394.334 
  Year 7211.509 4.447 .000 4032.694 10390.323 
  AC_Inc 5791.733 3.011 .003 2022.074 9561.392 
  AC_Pop 15909.311 2.968 .003 5402.143 26416.479 
  AC_Bul -198.914 -.702 .483 -754.157 356.328 
  A_Upr -13641.419 -1.806 .071 -28450.071 1167.234 
  A_Cci 10284.451 5.009 .000 6259.936 14308.967 
  A_Mgr -36982.961 -4.884 .000 -51823.465 -22142.456 
  A_Css -320.210 -.939 .348 -988.604 348.184 
  IA_Ifc_1L 3.952 7.417 .000 2.907 4.996 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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New Houses 
 
The regression results for New houses are provided in Table 8.  All outputs are of the 
expected sign and significance with the exception of building approvals (both sign and 
significance), unemployment (significance only) and consumer confidence (sign only).   
 
Given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of the developer contribution 
coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 4.694 and significance of .002, this indicates that these 
results provide strong evidence that a $1.00 increase in developer contributions increases 
new house prices in Brisbane by $4.69.   
 
Table 8  Regression Results – New Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 
37191.848 3.466 .001 16156.191 58227.505 
  Area 195.553 22.305 .000 178.365 212.741 
  Bedrooms 27913.613 8.441 .000 21430.178 34397.048 
  Bathrooms 113806.119 27.878 .000 105803.054 121809.183 
  Carparks 12963.587 3.435 .001 5565.084 20362.090 
  (Constant) -29036230.56 -15.14 .000 -32793836.87 -25278624.26 
2 Area 199.891 23.675 .000 183.338 216.443 
  Bedrooms 25227.309 8.007 .000 19050.826 31403.791 
  Bathrooms 103082.912 26.516 .000 95461.476 110704.348 
  Carparks 11579.638 3.245 .001 4584.681 18574.595 
  SEIFA 12029.572 15.396 .000 10497.725 13561.419 
  Year 14441.131 15.126 .000 12569.407 16312.855 
  Region 41703.515 12.521 .000 35173.778 48233.252 
  (Constant) -1231169.278 -.137 .891 -18909580.94 16447242.37 
  Area 193.080 23.103 .000 176.696 209.465 
3 Bedrooms 24003.477 7.737 .000 17921.101 30085.854 
  Bathrooms 102232.747 26.703 .000 94727.034 109738.461 
  Carparks 12434.172 3.539 .000 5545.413 19322.931 
  SEIFA 12442.444 16.109 .000 10928.161 13956.727 
  Year 777.255 .174 .862 -7984.808 9539.317 
  Region 89928.398 3.910 .000 44833.248 135023.549 
  AC_Inc 12479.622 2.409 .016 2321.766 22637.477 
  AC_Pop 16419.595 1.170 .242 -11083.955 43923.145 
  AC_Bul -1945.120 -2.429 .015 -3515.362 -374.878 
  A_Upr -54317.090 -2.563 .010 -95869.475 -12764.706 
  A_Cci 9469.512 1.683 .092 -1560.995 20500.019 
  A_Mgr -72085.602 -3.508 .000 -112373.233 -31797.971 
  A_Css 1283.543 1.402 .161 -511.572 3078.657 
  DC_1L 4.694 3.126 .002 1.750 7.638 
*95.0% Confidence Interval for Beta 
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Existing Houses 
 
The regression results for Existing houses are provided in Table 9.  All outputs are of the 
expected sign and significance at five percent with the exception of building approvals (both 
sign and significance), unemployment (significance only) and consumer confidence (sign 
only).  This indicates that these results provide evidence that a $1.00 increase in developer 
contributions increases existing house prices in Brisbane by $3.56.   
 
Table 9  Regression Results – Existing Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 
76752.470 22.662 .000 70114.178 83390.762 
  Area 139.140 68.522 .000 135.160 143.120 
  Bedrooms 32926.410 29.167 .000 30713.692 35139.128 
  Bathrooms 87624.612 65.123 .000 84987.296 90261.928 
  Carparks 9567.893 10.267 .000 7741.338 11394.447 
  (Constant) -31795355.4 -42.39 .000 -33265479.3 -30325231 
2 Area 146.358 78.335 .000 142.696 150.020 
  Bedrooms 26521.479 25.704 .000 24499.095 28543.863 
  Bathrooms 68516.353 54.144 .000 66036.015 70996.692 
  Carparks 10029.803 11.761 .000 8358.246 11701.360 
  SEIFA 14724.433 54.739 .000 14197.195 15251.671 
  Year 15836.439 42.387 .000 15104.128 16568.749 
  Region 50179.764 37.402 .000 47550.117 52809.411 
  (Constant) -18532657.4 -5.277 .000 -25416832.2 -11648482 
  Area 145.258 79.592 .000 141.680 148.835 
3 Bedrooms 26462.432 26.268 .000 24487.873 28436.991 
  Bathrooms 68817.871 55.692 .000 66395.850 71239.892 
  Carparks 10378.336 12.461 .000 8745.863 12010.810 
  SEIFA 14749.258 56.156 .000 14234.448 15264.068 
  Year 9301.686 5.343 .000 5889.205 12714.167 
  Region 45712.234 5.336 .000 28921.032 62503.436 
  AC_Inc 4323.978 2.087 .037 262.205 8385.750 
  AC_Pop 16448.521 2.837 .005 5085.394 27811.647 
  AC_Bul 229.834 .757 .449 -365.021 824.689 
  A_Upr -2775.518 -.342 .732 -18677.966 13126.931 
  A_Cci 10471.111 4.756 .000 6156.101 14786.120 
  A_Mgr -27883.372 -3.412 .001 -43903.279 -11863.466 
  A_Css -705.090 -1.912 .056 -1428.071 17.890 
  DC_1L 3.565 6.266 .000 2.450 4.680 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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Findings 
This study provides strong evidence that developer contributions in Brisbane, Queensland, 
after accounting for macroeconomic conditions and other factors that influence housing 
price, significantly increased the price of both new and existing houses during the period of 
2005 to 2011, increasing house prices to a magnitude of between three to four times the 
cost of the developer contribution levied per house.  This evidence supports the theory that 
despite developer contributions being levied on property developers, these supply chain 
costs are passed onto the end home buyer, resulting in higher house prices for all houses, 
and thus reducing housing affordability for all house buyers in the community.  This study 
provides evidence that not only are developer contributions being passed onto consumers, 
they are being significantly over-passed.  Hence, as expected it is home buyers that bear the 
burden of developer contributions and are the party who is really paying for urban 
infrastructure.   
 
This finding of over-passing is consistent with the literature and theory.  In saying that 
however, there are both notable similarities and differences between the US findings and 
these findings for Australia.  Firstly, at $3.95 for every $1.00 developer contribution (or 395% 
overpassing for All), the all house findings are approximately double the average study 
range quoted in the US literature of $1.50 - $1.70 (Nelson et al., 2008).  Whilst this could be 
due to data limitations, it is also possible that is a reflection of the nature of the Australian 
housing market.  Analysis  indicates that the US housing market is highly segmented, with 
two, three and four bedroom houses representing approximately equal proportions of the 
housing stock in the State of Florida (Burge, 2005).  In comparison, two bedroom houses are 
rare in the Brisbane market even in the established house sector, with approximately a 
quarter of homes having three bedrooms, and the remaining three quarters comprising four 
or more bedroomsiv.  Burge’s (2005) findings suggested that developer contribution impacts 
were highest in the larger homes, where greater price elasticity is suggested to exist (42% 
onpassing for small houses versus 134% for large houses).  Mathur also stratified his 
research to test for such differential on-passing effects.  Using house quality as an 
independent variable (rather than house size as for Burge, 2005) Mathur et al.’s (2004) 
findings also suggested higher overpassing to high quality homes (358% onpassing for high 
quality housing compared to 166% for average quality).  Thus it could be interpreted that the 
Australian housing market comprises on average higher quality/larger homes than in the US 
and that these Australian findings are consistent with the US findings that developers can 
more readily pass additional costs onto higher quality housing.  
 
The high on-passing ratio in Australia could also be a function of the uncertainty associated 
with a fully negotiated opaque infrastructure charging regime.  During the study period, 
developer contributions were escalating rapidly resulting in general confusion and 
uncertainty in the wider development industry around forecast project costs (Nicholls, 2011).  
Conversely, in the US studies, set fees per lot were scheduled with annual increases 
announced in advance.  Theory suggests that in a fully transparent system, such supply 
chain costs are able to be passed back to the land owner, and yet overpassing at a 
consistent level existed in all US studies undertaken.  Indeed Shaughnessy’s (2003) study 
on land price impacts suggested that back-passing and over-passing were occurring 
contemporaneously, albeit with weak evidence.     
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A second comparative finding is that whilst the average of US studies is quoted at $1.50 - 
$1.70 (Nelson et al, 2008), this may not be representative of all studies.  Many authors 
tested for the differential effects on new and existing houses, however not all authors pooled 
their datasets to estimate the effect on all housing in the community as was done in this 
study.  Of the US models only Burge (2005) (72%) and Evan’s-Cowley et al.(2009) (537%) 
analysed the developer contribution effect on all houses.  And only Evan’s-Cowley et al. 
(2009) then separated their dataset to further examine the differential effects on new and 
existing houses; a model enhancement followed by this study.   
 
This study’s findings of 395% for all houses is within the range of the findings in the literature 
and provides further evidence that existing home owners share the burden of developer 
contributions by way of the increased cost of existing housing (Brueckner 1997; Singell and 
Lillydahl 1990; Yinger 1998).  Existing housing generally forms the bulk of a market and 
plays a central role in price setting.  Existing housing may be a close substitute to new 
housing and if the price of new housing is increasing due to cost pressures and strong 
market conditions, then the price of existing housing will be drawn up as sellers capitalise on 
profit taking opportunities.   Hence buyers of existing housing are paying for the house price 
impacts of developer contributions in new development areas, for which they either receive 
no benefit, or if there is a benefit (such as new road connections or upgrades) then they 
have not contributed to the cost of such services.  This over passing to existing home 
owners is a windfall capital gain to existing home owners, to the detriment of housing 
affordability within the community whereby homes that previously might have been more 
affordable are dragged up in price due to their close substitutability with more expensive new 
homes.   
 
Thirdly, it is relevant to compare the observed effect for new houses compared to existing 
houses.  This study suggests the new house effects ($4.69) are higher than for existing 
houses ($3.56) in Australia.  The results of prior studies that test the differential effect on 
new and existing homes are not consistent in this regard.  This Australian finding is 
consistent with Campbell (2004) ($1.43 new and $1.07 existing).  However the converse was 
found by Evans-Cowley et al.(2009) with existing houses significantly more impacted than 
new houses ($1.76 new and $6.03 existing).  Both Mathur (2003) and Shaughnessy’s (2004) 
findings were similar for new and existing housing (Mathur: $1.34 new, $1.47 existing; 
Shaughnessy, $1.64 new, $1.68 existing).  Thus the literature is inconsistent in regard to the 
differential effects between new and existing housing.  Indeed, Nelson et al. (2008) 
questions whether overpassing does actually occur for existing houses, with the evidence to 
that time ranging from $1.07 (Campbell) to $1.68 (Shaughnessy).  Evans-Cowley et al.’s 
(2009) subsequent findings ($6.03), together with the findings from this study ($3.56) confirm 
that overpassing in the existing house market is indeed occurring, albeit at varying rates.   
 
Little commentary is provided in any of the prior studies on this observation in the existing 
housing market.  With existing housing being the predominant housing type in most housing 
markets, any inflationary price effects to existing housing will have an impact on housing 
affordability across the wider community.  A possible explanation of the impact of developer 
contributions on existing houses is that the effect is a function of local housing markets and 
the relative substitutability of new and existing houses.  In a market with good quality existing 
homes, new homes of a high standard might be developed to entice existing owners into 
new housing stock.  A propensity of developers to build high quality new housing may lead 
to higher on-passing consistent with the findings of Burge (2005) and Mathur (2003) 
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discussed in the prior paragraph.  In such an environment, new house price effects may be 
higher than existing house price effects due to elasticity in the quality new home market.  On 
the other hand, existing house prices might be affected to a large extent if the existing 
housing stock in a local market is of a low quality and new housing is introduced aimed at 
similar target markets.  The price of existing housing is dragged up as home buyers exercise 
a preference for better located existing housing that can be cost effectively renovated, 
compared to newer houses built on the urban fringe.  Studies that show similar findings may 
exist in areas with high substitutability in new and existing housing markets.  Remembering 
that in Australia, new and existing housing are close substitutes from a services perspective 
as all residents have access to essentially the same level of services and amenities.  In 
saying that, many older suburbs have the benefit of better proximity to those services.  
 
Finally, new house effects and existing house effects in this study are close in magnitude.  
As can be seen from above, with the exception of Evan’s-Cowley et al.(2009), this is 
consistent with the literature.  Evan’s-Cowley et al.’s (2009) study incorporates a “years 
since fee introduced” variable to test for short and long term impacts.  When this variable is 
removed (making its approach more consistent with earlier studies) the existing house 
impact reduces to $2.50.  
 
With the findings of overpassing of developer contributions to home buyers in the Australian 
market now established, the rationale for such a phenomenon requires consideration.  
Various reasons for overpassing have been hypothesised in the literature, however no 
studies have provided evidence in this regard.  The rationale provided tends to sit in one of 
two camps being that of the “old view” where overpassing is a burden to the buyer in 
compensation to the developer for increased risks, financing and holding costs associated 
with increases to the supply chain costs and approval time frames (Singell and Lillydahl 
1990, Baden and Coursey 1999, Mathur 2003, Campbell 2004); and the “new view” where 
the extent of overpassing represents a willingness of the buyer to prepay for the provision of 
services and amenities that would be otherwise funded by future property taxes (Yinger, 
1998, Shaughnessy, 2003, Burge, 2004, Evans-Cowley et al., 2009).  This is a topic for 
future research.  
 
Given this study is the first of its kind in Australia, it is acknowledged that it is subject to a 
number of limitations.  Developer charge data collection was a challenge for this project, and 
is likely to be a reason why work of this nature has remained unexamined up until now.  A 
further limitation of this study is associated with the categorisation of sales into New or 
Existing housing.  As discussed previously a data rule was established which required 
manual coding of more than 80,000 sales records from 2003 - 2011.  Any manual coding is 
subject to human error.  Future research would benefit from working closely with local 
authorities to gain access to more detailed developer contribution data, so that the 
associated house price effects can be more accurately estimated. 
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Opportunities for Reform 
 
Home ownership is declining in Australia and the reasons for this are the subject of much 
policy debate.  Development industry bodies maintain that developer contributions are a 
significant contributor to the supply-side cost drivers of increasing house prices.  In a climate 
where housing affordability and increasing home ownership is a policy objective for many 
governments, a clear understanding of the impacts government charges have on the price of 
housing is imperative.   
 
The purpose of this report has been to inform the House of Representatives Inquiry into 
Home Ownership.  It specifically addresses Terms of Reference items 2, 4 and 5 being: 
 Demand and supply drivers in the housing market; 
 The impact of current tax policy at all levels; and 
 Opportunities for reform. 
This research provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of developer contributions 
on house prices in Australia.  This research provides evidence in support of the proposition 
that not only are developer contributions over passed to new home buyers, but also to 
buyers of existing homes.   
 
Here we have provided evidence of a $28,000 charge that is levied on the developers of new 
housing (in Queensland), flowing through the supply chain, ending up costing housing 
consumers over $338,000 over the life of their home loan.  Thus the price inflationary effect 
of these developer taxes are being felt by all home buyers across the community, resulting in 
increased mortgage repayments of an additional $939 per month for all house buyers.  This 
is clearly in inefficient and inequitable tax that is ripe for reform.   
 
These results are important as they inform government on the outcomes of current tax 
policy, providing the first such evidence of its kind in Australia.   
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i Four years was selected as this provides time for pre-selling of the lot prior to registration of the lot, as well as 
construction of the house post registration of the lot, a holding period to avoid capital gains tax and a selling period.   
 
ii For example, the Brisbane City Council area is some 1,380 square kilometres. 
iii Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) is a product developed by the ABS that ranks areas in Australia 
according to relative socio-economic advantage and disadvantage. The indexes are based on information from 
the five-yearly Census. IRSAD of one of the SEIFA indexes.  
iv Detached houses for sale in the Greater Brisbane region as at February, 2014 as listed on 
www.realestate.com.au 
